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ARTICLE
EQUITABLE HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS:
BRIDGING THE LEFT-RIGHT DIVIDE
SAMUEL ESTREICHER & CLINTON G. WALLACE*
This Article offers the first comprehensive legal-policy critique of existing
Health Savings Accounts (“HSAs”), arguing that the current approach is redis-
tributively regressive, thus exacerbating inequality, and also fails to accomplish
stated healthcare goals. We propose an alternative—Equitable Health Savings
Accounts—which uses cash grants as a tool to address both of these problems.
Equitable HSAs are a market-based social program that calibrates size and de-
livery of a government subsidy to help the least well-off and to facilitate partici-
pation in healthcare markets. Equitable HSAs can serve as a model for using
cash grants to bridge the gap between Republican social policy proposals that
generally carry a market libertarian flavor and Democratic proposals that are
focused on redistribution and social safety nets. Contrary to conventional politi-
cal wisdom and academic commentary on the tradeoff between equity and effi-
ciency, these goals need not be mutually exclusive. Rather, as our Equitable
HSA proposal demonstrates, cash grants can strengthen market forces, allowing
policymakers to harness the benefits of markets to achieve policy goals while
engaging in redistribution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Polarization of the two major political parties reflects in part their dif-
fering views of the value of reliance on market forces. The parties disagree
as to whether government can play a useful role in setting ground rules for
competition and redistributing resources from the wealthy to less well-off
groups. On the progressive side are those who focus on egalitarian out-
comes, and thus advocate for social policies that redistribute resources
downward from the top economic rungs. On the market libertarian side are
those who focus on efficiency and advocate social policies that minimize tax
burdens and government intervention.1 Democrats are generally—and in-
creasingly—more aligned with the former, while Republicans are generally
more aligned with the latter.2
This left-right divide also characterizes debate over healthcare policy.
One recent manifestation of this ideological divide is Republican advocacy
for, and Democratic resistance to, Health Savings Accounts (“HSAs”).3
Current policy provides a tax deduction for contributions to HSAs made by
individuals and families enrolled in certain high-deductible health insurance
plans. Investment gains on funds in an HSA account are exempt from taxa-
tion; the accounts are intended to cover medical expenses and can be used
for some other purposes as well. Republicans have made HSAs a centerpiece
of various health reform plans, including proposals debated during their
2017 effort to repeal the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), a 2018 bill endorsed
by Republicans on the House Ways and Means Committee, and the health-
care reform agenda recently produced by the Trump administration.4 But
Democrats remain steadfastly opposed to expanding HSAs on distributional
grounds. They argue that HSAs primarily benefit higher-income people who
are able to use HSAs as a vehicle for tax-preferred savings.
Despite these disagreements, it is clear that there are potentially signifi-
cant benefits to increasing individuals’ savings for healthcare expenditures.
Whether or not the ACA is retained or the country moves to a “Medicare-
for-all” or a “single-payer” plan—progressive Democratic desiderata with
uncertain political prospects—there will almost certainly be a continuing
1 See generally LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGLE, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND
JUSTICE (2002).
2 See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, REWRITING THE RULES OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY:
AN AGENDA FOR GROWTH AND SHARED PROSPERITY (2015).
3 See 26 U.S.C. § 223 (2012); CAROL RAPAPORT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21573, TAX-
ADVANTAGED ACCOUNTS FOR HEALTH CARE EXPENSES: SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON (2013),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21573.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TMJ-HCS2].
4 See Better Care Reconciliation Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. (2017); Restoring
Access to Medication Act of 2018, H.R. Rep. No. 115-850 (2018); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REFORMING AMERICA’S
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM THROUGH CHOICE AND COMPETITION (Dec. 2018) (responding to Execu-
tive Order 13813, which directed those departments to collaborate to produce a report setting
out market-oriented healthcare policy options).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\56-2\HLL205.txt unknown Seq: 3 28-MAY-19 15:18
2019] Equitable HSAs 397
need for policymakers to consider out-of-pocket costs.5 A recent report by
the Federal Reserve found that 23% of adults had a “major unexpected out-
of-pocket medical expense” in the prior year, and 25% passed on at least
one healthcare intervention due to affordability during the same period.6
Moreover, ten percent of adults (twenty-four million individuals) reported
they owed debt on out-of-pocket medical expenses incurred in the previous
year, and forty-four percent said they “could not cover an emergency [medi-
cal] expense costing $400” or could only cover it by borrowing money or
selling something.7
We believe HSAs hold the promise of addressing the problem of inade-
quate savings to cover out-of-pocket healthcare expenses, and can be de-
signed to meet equity/distribution concerns raised by their progressive
critics.8 We propose “Equitable Health Savings Accounts,” which is a mar-
ket-based, consumer-driven social program that relies on cash grants, and
that calibrates the government subsidy to help the least well-off and to facili-
tate participation in healthcare markets. We critique the current HSA policy,
showing that unless HSAs are redesigned to provide benefits to a larger pop-
ulation, they will continue to fall short of achieving the stated goals of
advocates.
Our proposal introduces targeted cash grants to allow people with few
economic resources of their own to benefit from HSA subsidies. Along with
other reforms we propose, this expansion of HSAs to a larger portion of the
population will advance the Republican goal of stimulating market forces in
healthcare provision and the Democratic goal of more egalitarian healthcare
policies.
After we detail our proposal, we turn to a broader consideration of Eq-
uitable HSAs as an example of how cash grants can—when properly de-
signed—be used to promote market-oriented objectives along with
egalitarian goals.9 Attacks from each side of the political spectrum often
5 Out-of-pocket costs refer to the costs incurred by patients to cover healthcare services
that are not covered by insurance. See Peter A. Ubel, Can Patients in the United States Become
Savvy Health Care Consumers?, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1749, 1757 (2014). These costs include
deductibles, which are the amounts a patient must spend before health insurance begins to
cover costs, and co-pays and co-insurance, which are flat fees or percentage shares that pa-
tients are charged for particular types of services covered by insurance. Id. These “out-of-
pocket” costs do not refer to the patients’ share of the cost of insurance coverage (i.e., the
premiums paid for insurance). Id.
6
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE, REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL BEING OF
U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2016 2 (2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2016-
report-economic-well-being-us-households-201705.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7BM-6ZWF].
7 Id.
8 This article focuses on healthcare expenditures not usually covered by insurance. It as-
sumes the continuation of the ACA or other federal programs to subsidize hospital and pro-
vider costs on basic healthcare services.
9 See infra Part IV; see also Ari Glogower & Clinton G. Wallace, Shades of Basic Income,
in SHARING THE GAINS OF THE U.S. GLOBAL ECONOMY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY 70TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR (2018) (discussing cash grants to augment
or replace existing social safety net programs). Conversely, explicitly redistributive policies
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miss the point that market-based social policy need not be distributively re-
gressive or constructed in a way that furthers (or exacerbates) existing ine-
qualities. It is a matter of context and design features whether market-based
policies are neutral or fair in their distributional consequences.10
As illustrated by our Equitable HSA proposal, cash grants can provide a
practical yet elegant tool for melding market-based policy with redistributive
goals—simple for the government to administer, simple for recipients to use
in the desired way, and effective. Our focus here is limited to conditional
cash grants, by which we mean cash grants that are available to a limited
portion of the population and with strings attached, but this discussion also
sheds further light on recent debates about the potential efficacy of universal
basic income proposals, which involve large, unconditional cash grants.11
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II evaluates current HSAs in
terms of their failure to consider income effects, which undermines stated
policy goals to promote participation in healthcare markets. Part III sets out
our proposal for Equitable HSAs as a replacement for the existing HSA re-
gime. Part IV pursues a broader discussion of the implications of Equitable
HSAs, arguing that cash grants can provide a practical, effective mechanism
for bridging the policy divide between right and left in healthcare and other
contexts. This Part considers potential advantages and disadvantages of cash
grants as a tool for carrying out social policy, from both an egalitarian per-
spective and a market libertarian perspective. Part V concludes.
II. CURRENT HSAS: A REDISTRIBUTIVELY REGRESSIVE REGIME
As currently configured, participants in high-deductible health insur-
ance plans12 are permitted to receive a tax deduction for contributions to
HSAs, and investments in HSAs are allowed to grow tax-free.13 An individ-
ual can contribute up to $3450 to an HSA, and a family that files a joint
return can contribute up to $6900; these amounts are adjusted annually for
inflation.14 Around twenty million Americans have HSA-eligible health
can be designed to harness the power of private markets, and, in some situations, reliance on
private markets can improve redistributive effects.
10 See generally Richard Revesz, Regulation and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489
(2018).
11 See generally ANNIE LOWERY, GIVE PEOPLE MONEY (2018).
12 A high-deductible plan is defined as a health plan which has an annual deductible that is
at least $1350 for self-coverage and $2700 for families. 26 U.S.C. § 223(c)(2)(A) (2012); Rev.
Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. 392. Additionally, the sum of annual “out-of-pocket” expenses
envisioned by the plan (with the exclusion of premiums) and the annual deductible cannot
exceed $6650 for self-coverage and $13,300 for family coverage. Id.
13 The deduction is permitted for direct contributions by the beneficiary, or for contribu-
tions made on a beneficiary’s behalf on a “pre-tax” basis; these alternative mechanisms are
functionally the same, allowing contributions to reduce the amount of income that is subject to
tax each year. See 26 U.S.C. § 223(a).
14 See Rev. Proc. 2018-27, 2018-20 I.R.B. 591; Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. 392;
see also 26 U.S.C. § 223(b)(1), (b)(2), (g)(1). The I.R.S. originally announced that the joint
filing limit for 2018 would be $6900, but the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act passed in late 2017
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plans.15 Because funds in an HSA remain the property of the account holder/
contributor, they can be carried over from year to year, even if the contribu-
tor moves to a non-qualifying insurance plan (i.e., to a plan other than a
high-deductible plan).16 HSA funds can be withdrawn and used for any qual-
ifying medical expenses, a category which includes prescription drugs, doc-
tors’ visits, procedures and the like,17 but which excludes payments for
medical insurance and over-the-counter medications.18 Currently, HSA ac-
count holders can withdraw amounts for non-healthcare spending, subject to
income tax and an additional excise tax of twenty percent.19
To proponents of HSAs, the accounts are an exemplar of the promise of
“consumer-driven” healthcare, working to give patients decisional auton-
omy and control over costs throughout the healthcare system.20 These advo-
cates seek to expand HSAs by increasing the amounts that can be
contributed and allowing the accounts to be used for a wider range of medi-
cal expenses than present law permits.21 By allowing and encouraging indi-
changed the inflation adjustment formula, so the I.R.S. reduced the limit to $6850, but then
changed it back to $6900 due to administrative concerns related to employers and employees
having already set automatic contributions for the year based on the $6900 amount. See Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054; Rev. Proc. 2018-27, 2018-20
I.R.B. 591; see also JOINT COMM. ON TAX., JCX-69-17, MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT” (Dec. 22, 2017).
15 See AM.’S HEALTH INS. PLANS, 2016 SURVEY OF HEALTH SAVS. ACCOUNT-HIGH DE-
DUCTIBLE HEALTH PLANS (Feb. 2017), https://www.ahip.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/
2016_HSASurvey_Draft_2.14.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BD4-NWXS]; NAT’L CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE ACTIONS ON HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND CONSUMER-
DIRECTED HEALTH PLANS, 2004-2017 (Oct. 10, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/
hsas-health-savings-accounts.aspx [https://perma.cc/RJC9-GH5M].
16 As a result, there are substantially fewer than 20 million households currently making
contributions to HSAs—some of which are holding balances from earlier contributions.
17 26 U.S.C. §§ 213(d), 223(d)(2) (2012).
18 Id. § 223(d)(2) (there are certain exceptions, such as payments for COBRA coverage).
19 Id. § 223(f)(2), (f)(4).
20 Wendy Netter Epstein, Price Transparency and Incomplete Contracts in Health Care,
67 EMORY L.J. 1, 27–28 (2017) (assessing the challenge of price transparency in “consumer-
driven” healthcare generally, and providing a summary of the growth of consumerism in
healthcare policy generally, and HSAs specifically). See generally Scott A. Becker, Health
Savings Accounts: The Next Generation in Health Insurance, 62 BENCH & B. MINN. 22
(2005); Health Savings Account (HSA)—Creative Cost Savings for Health Care, 8 LAW. J. 6
(2006); Angel B. McCall, Health Savings Accounts May Reduce Health Insurance Costs, 34
COLO. LAW. 57 (2005); David S. Wakelin, Health Savings Accounts: The Start of Something
Big?, 20 ME. B.J. 116 (2005).
21 See, e.g., Restoring Access to Medication Act of 2018, H.R. Rep. No. 115-850, 115th
Cong. (2018). Republicans in the House Ways and Means Committee proposed a bill that
would allow people to use HSA funds to purchase over-the-counter medical and feminine
products. See also Representative Pat Tiberi, Consumer Directed Health Plans with HSAs Are
Growing in Popularity, JOINT ECON. COMM. (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.jec.senate.gov/pub-
lic/index.cfm/republicans/2017/3/consumer-directed-health-plans-with-hsas-are-growing-in-
popularity [https://perma.cc/MA7W-RBUU]. Senate Republicans in summer 2017 proposed
to increase the amount that can be put into HSAs, and to allow HSA funds to be spent on
insurance premiums and nonprescription drugs. American Health Care Act of 2017 (AHCA),
H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. (2017). President Trump’s transition team endorsed HSAs as a re-
placement for the Affordable Care Act. See Lauren R. Roth, Redefining “Medical Care”, 27
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 67 (2017).
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viduals and families to price-shop, HSAs introduce price sensitivity for
products and services that might otherwise be insulated from such forces.
But to critics, HSAs are merely a tool for providing tax deductions and tax-
favored investments to the very people who least need special tax benefits in
meeting their healthcare needs.22 Research has provided support for both
sides, showing that HSAs do indeed reduce healthcare costs,23 although the
immediate source of the reduction is reduced healthcare consumption, which
may not be a good thing.24
HSAs promote the patient-as-consumer model through a few different
mechanisms. First, with high-deductible plans generally, patients have their
personal funds at stake for ordinary healthcare costs, so patients should be
more discerning and price-sensitive than if they simply had a flat co-pay
under a non-high-deductible plan. The idea is that simply making patients
price-aware may have an effect on pricing throughout the system. Second,
and related, patients are not locked into using only those providers that are
“in network,” so patients are encouraged to shop between providers and to
consider alternative courses of treatment in ways they might not be able to if
choices were more limited as is likely under a standard plan. The theory is
that by giving consumers greater control over how their dollars are spent,
HSAs allow market forces to improve the healthcare delivery system.25
The current tax benefits of HSAs are potentially significant, but not all
those benefits are focused on accomplishing stated healthcare policy goals.
First, all contributions to HSAs up to the limit are deductible from gross
income.26 This deductibility should encourage participation in HSAs, and
perhaps by extension encourage participation in high-deductible plans. The
22 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Is Health Insurance a Bad Idea? The Consumer-Driven Per-
spective, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 377, 387 (2008) (“[I]t seems to be bringing us tax subsidized
retirement savings for the rich, high deductible health plans and financial misery for the
poor.”); see Roth, supra note 21, at 69; see also TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT R
RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN MOVEMENT 146 (2007); Michael Hiltzik, Health
Savings Accounts: Another Conservative ‘reform’ nostrum that chiefly benefits the rich, L.A.
TIMES (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-hsa-20161118-
story.html [https://perma.cc/86KQ-PAVX].
23 E.g., PAUL FRONSTIN & M. CHRISTOPHER ROEBUCK, THE IMPACT OF AN HSA-ELIGIBLE
HEALTH PLAN ON HEALTH CARE SERVICES USE AND SPENDING BY WORKER INCOME, EMP.
BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF NO. 425, 17 (Aug. 2016), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/
EBRI_IB_425.Aug16.HSAs.pdf [http://perma.cc/5BHA-S783].
24 See id. The Employee Benefit Research Institute report finds that HSAs lead to fewer
doctor visits overall, but the decrease is much larger among lower-income earners (people
earning less than $50,000) as compared to higher-income earners (people earning more than
$100,000). See id. at 1. HSAs also reduce use of prescription drugs without regard to differ-
ences in income levels. See id.
25 See David Pratt, Healthy and Wealthy and Dead: Health Savings Accounts, 19 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 7, 9–14 (2006) (describing in detail the requirements for HSA accounts and
the mechanics of qualifying for, and making use of, an HSA); see also EDWARD A. ZELINSKY,
THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY: HOW THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM
CHANGED AMERICA 60–63 (2008) (describing the origins of HSAs in “medical savings ac-
counts,” which were established by Congress in 1996 for certain employees of small
businesses).
26 26 U.S.C. § 223 (2012).
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HSA deduction is widely available because it is an above-the-line deduc-
tion,27 but (as discussed below) taking advantage of the deduction requires
having access to a qualifying healthcare plan and having funds available to
set aside for medical expenses.
Contributions to HSAs are also deductible from the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (“FICA”) tax base, meaning that HSA contributions are
not subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes. For example, consider a
single individual earning the social security maximum of $128,400 in 2018,
who contributes the maximum $3450 to an HSA and the same amount to a
401(k). Each contribution will reduce her taxable income by the full $3450,
reducing her federal income tax liability by $828. The HSA contribution will
also reduce her payroll tax base, saving her 6.2% Social Security tax and
1.45% Medicare tax, for a total of $264 in additional savings. This deduction
for FICA purposes is not available for 401(k) or IRA contributions. This
differential treatment for FICA purposes may sound insignificant, but if that
amount is invested through the HSA for forty years and earns a 10% annual
return (less than the stock market average over the last forty years), that
$264 has a present value of nearly $12,000. For high-income individuals
whose income exceeds the Social Security threshold, the benefit is reduced:
these taxpayers save the 1.45% Medicare tax only, yielding Medicare tax
savings of about $100 per year for a family.28
The second tax benefit is that gains on investments made with HSA
funds are tax-free.29 For example, if an HSA has a cash balance of $2000
from contributions in a previous year, the account owner can invest those
funds in stocks or bonds or other assets. If the investment yields a 10%
return on the year—$200—and the owner sells the stock, the $200 would,
under usual income tax rules, be included in income (i.e., the gain on stock
is realized and recognized because the stock is sold at a gain). However,
under the HSA rules, the $200 is not included in income. Indeed, if the $200
gain is used for qualifying healthcare costs at any time, that gain is never
subject to tax.
Together, the deduction for contributions and the exclusion of gains on
HSA investments have been estimated to add up to approximately $2.2 bil-
lion of foregone revenue for the federal government in 2016; a sum expected
27 Deductions from gross income—i.e., deductions made to arrive at what the tax code
calls “Adjusted Gross Income,” commonly referred to as “above-the-line” deductions—have
historically been more valuable than so-called below-the-line deductions—i.e., deductions
made from Adjusted Gross Income to calculate taxable income. All qualifying taxpayers are
permitted to take above-the-line deductions. In contrast, below-the-line deductions are only
permitted for the subset of taxpayers who take itemized deductions.
28 Like 401(k) contributions and IRA contributions, for high-income earners, HSA contri-
butions are not included in the base for calculating the 3.8% net investment income tax. See 26
U.S.C. § 1411.
29 Id. § 223(e).
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to rise to $4 billion dollars by 2020.30 For comparison, the revenue cost of
the exclusion from income for employer-provided health insurance is be-
tween $155 billion and $189 billion each year—that is, the HSA tax benefit
is modest in comparison.31
HSAs are susceptible to criticism on distributional grounds because
high-income earners are the primary group that takes advantage of the HSA
tax subsidy. This is in part the result of the distribution of resources resulting
from other markets: people with lower incomes have less money available to
commit to use for healthcare generally. An HSA thus exacerbates the ex-
isting distribution in practice by making a tax benefit realistically available
only to higher income households.
But to the extent the problem is that among participants in HSAs,
greater benefits are available to those with higher incomes as compared to
lower incomes, this is purely a matter of program design. The amount of the
tax benefit from HSA contributions is based on each taxpayer’s marginal tax
rate, which means the federal government provides a larger HSA subsidy to
people in higher tax brackets. This effect is referred to in the tax policy
literature as the “upside-down” subsidy effect.32 For example, a taxpayer in
the top federal income tax bracket, i.e., a couple making over $600,000 per
year, is taxed at the top 37% marginal rate. Because of the tax rate, the
government in essence subsidizes 37% of any deductible expenditure. Thus,
if the individual contributes $1000 to an HSA, the contribution saves the
taxpayer $370 of federal income tax liability, even as the HSA contribution
constitutes less than 0.2% of that couple’s taxable income. On the other
hand, a taxpayer earning $50,000 per year is in the 22% tax bracket; so
making the same $1000 contribution saves just $220 per year, for a contribu-
tion of 2% of her taxable income, a much more significant sum.
The contribution limits bring the upside-down subsidy problem into
stark relief: under current policy, for a couple with income in excess of
$600,000 the government provides a subsidy of $2915.33 This is nearly four
times as much in dollar terms as a lower-income individual, who, if she can
make the maximum HSA contribution, receives less than $680 in subsidy.34
Obviously the subsidy is even less for those in lower tax brackets who con-
30
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 115TH CONG., JCX-3-17, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2016-2020, at 38 (Jan. 30, 2017). Note, however, that
these estimates pre-date the legislation Congress enacted at the end of 2017 that reduced tax
rates. Lower tax rates make the deduction reduce revenue by less, which means that, relative to
this new baseline, HSAs will be less costly to the government. These lower rates also poten-
tially reduce the incentive effect of the deduction.
31 Id. at 37.
32 See, e.g., STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 103 (1985).
33 This is calculated as the $6900 maximum deductible contributions, which for a taxpayer
in the top marginal tax bracket yields a deduction of thirty-seven percent, plus the 1.45%
Medicare payroll tax, plus the 3.8% net investment income tax, for a top marginal tax rate of
42.25%, and a total tax savings of $2915 on account of the contribution.
34 This is calculated as $3450 multiplied by the sum of twelve percent (the second lowest
bracket, which applies to taxable income between $9526 and $38,700 for an individual), plus
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tribute less, and it is reasonable to assume that people with lower incomes
will more often contribute less than the maximum amount. Moreover, be-
cause contributions to HSAs are deductible above-the-line (reducing ad-
justed gross income (“AGI”)), HSAs are not currently subject to income-
based limits that have often applied to below-the-line deductions (applying
only after AGI is calculated).35
For HSAs to work, the rules must require HSA funds to be spent on
healthcare expenses (ideally expenses that are consistent with realizing the
benefits of consumer-driven care). Otherwise, the revenue costs to the fisc
and the tax benefits connected to HSAs—that is, deductible contributions
and tax-free returns—will not be effective at promoting the healthcare goals
of HSAs. Indeed, current HSA policy does not ensure that HSA funds are
limited to healthcare expenses. This is because HSA funds can be withdrawn
for any purpose, without penalty, by anyone over the age of sixty-
five.36 Allowing withdrawals without penalty essentially turns HSAs into
supplemental 401(k) or IRA accounts, because the key benefit of those ac-
counts becomes deferral of income tax liability.
HSAs have become a significant investment vehicle for many high-
income people because of this feature, quite aside from any healthcare-re-
lated benefits.37 In essence, they allow the wealthy (those who can afford to
make large contributions to an HSA over a long period of time) and the
fortunate (those who do not have significant healthcare costs prior to age
sixty-five) an additional route for tax-preferred retirement savings, beyond
the favorable treatment accorded 401(k) accounts and IRAs. Further, unlike
IRAs, deductible HSA contributions are not phased out above a certain in-
come threshold.38 HSAs as structured thus work counter to the purposes of
Congress’s general retirement savings policy of both not devoting govern-
ment revenue to encourage additional savings by people with high incomes
and the stated healthcare policy goal of encouraging price-sensitive health-
care spending.
Moreover, in some respects, HSAs are even more advantageous retire-
ment savings vehicles than 401(k) accounts and IRAs. Most significantly,
unlike 401(k) accounts and IRAs, there are no required withdrawals from
the 6.2% Social Security tax, plus the 1.45% Medicare payroll tax, for a total marginal rate of
19.65%.
35 Additionally, below-the-line deductions have often been subject to limitations that dis-
allow certain deductions and reduce the amount of deduction for high-income earners. See 26
U.S.C. § 67 (2012) (allowing miscellaneous itemized deductions only to the extent that those
deductions exceed two percent of adjusted gross income); see also id. § 68 (reducing all item-
ized deductions by three percent of the amount that AGI exceeds a certain threshold). Each of
these provisions were temporarily repealed starting in 2018, but remain on the books and will
come back into effect unless Congress acts before 2026.
36 Id. § 223(f)(4)(A), (C). Non-healthcare withdrawals for individuals below age 65 are
subject to income tax. Id. § 223(f)(1), (2).
37 See generally LIVELY HSA: INVEST IN YOUR HEALTH, https://livelyme.com/ [http://per
ma.cc/8TZL-6F3Y].
38 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. R
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HSAs. The traditional tax-favored retirement accounts must be drawn down
starting at age seventy and one-half, ensuring that the accounts are used for
retirement consumption and not for estate planning purposes.39 In contrast,
HSAs have no withdrawal requirements—distributions are totally discretion-
ary regardless of the age of the beneficiary. When the account holder dies,
the balance in the HSA is included in the income of the beneficiary, similar
to IRA accounts.40
For high-income people with extra disposable income, HSAs can be
used purely as a savings vehicle. Consider the following example: a house-
hold earns $1 million of income each year (placing the household in the 37%
tax bracket), has $5000 of out-of-pocket medical expenses each year, con-
tributes $5000 to an HSA, and through that HSA can invest and earn 10%
each year. If the household uses the HSA funds each year to pay for medical
expenses, the total tax savings each year will be $1850. But if the household
instead leaves the $5000 balance in the HSA each year, then the tax benefit
begins to multiply. The $5000 earns $500, which is also tax-deferred. As
described above, when the earners in the household reach age sixty-five,
they can withdraw the HSA funds without penalty, and pay income tax at
that time. Rather than receiving the savings benefit only for funds that are in
excess of their annual out-of-pocket health costs, the HSA acts purely as a
savings vehicle.41
HSAs are an example of a policy that would benefit from renewed at-
tention to distributive equity. If the threshold policy goal is to incentivize
contributions to HSAs and thus promote out-of-pocket spending on health-
care in a manner that exhibits greater price sensitivity, it would make sense
to create stronger financial incentives—or provide financial resources—for
the lower-income people who are less able or likely to make contributions if
left to their own devices.42 Instead, under current policy, the skewed distribu-
39 Required withdrawals are a portion of the account balance, based on actuarial factors.
See 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(9).
40 Id. § 223(f)(8)(B). Thus the deferral benefit ends at the time of death of the account
holder. Note that when the beneficiary is a spouse, the deferral benefit continues and the
account continues to be treated as an HSA. Id. § 223(f)(8)(A).
41 For people with less disposable income, the savings feature may nonetheless serve a
healthcare function: it allows them to save tax-free for a future expensive adverse health event.
See Emily M. Mitchell & Steven R. Machlin, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEPS
STATISTICAL BRIEF #506, Concentration of Health Expenditures and Selected Characteristics
of High Spenders, U.S. Civilian Noninstitutionalized Population, 2015 (Dec. 2017), https://
meps.ahrq.gov/data_files/publications/st506/stat506.pdf [http://perma.cc/P6FR-CBFP] (re-
porting that the top 5% of the population accounted for 50.8% of total healthcare expendi-
tures). Another study found that in 2016, just 10% of the population accounted for 49% of out-
of-pocket healthcare costs, with an average out-of-pocket expense of $3482. DIANA FARRELL
& FIONA GREIG, J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO. INSTITUTE, PAYING OUT-OF-POCKET: THE
HEALTHCARE SPENDING OF 2 MILLION US FAMILIES, at 18 fig.12 (Sept. 2017). This suggests
that for a small portion of the population in any given year, it is helpful to have savings well in
excess of the median out-of-pocket cost. See infra Part III.
42 Compare David M. Schizer, Limiting Tax Expenditures, 68 TAX L. REV. 275, 280
(2015) (arguing that tax incentives should vary with income), with Lily L. Batchelder et al.,
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\56-2\HLL205.txt unknown Seq: 11 28-MAY-19 15:18
2019] Equitable HSAs 405
tion of benefits of HSAs further undermines the market-based healthcare
goals of the policy. Redistribution is not an animating purpose of existing
HSA policy, but the issues described above make clear that disregarding
distributional effects has undermined the market-based forces that HSAs are
intended to foster. The remainder of this Article considers how cash grants
can be used to strengthen HSAs and might serve as a model for integrating
redistribution with market-based policies.
III. EQUITABLE HSAS: REDISTRIBUTION USING MARKETS
We propose replacing the existing HSA regime with Equitable HSAs.
This new version of HSAs will cover out-of-pocket costs that are not likely
to be covered by an insurance program, so as to facilitate participation by
individuals, including those at the lower end of the income spectrum. The
proposal consists of a multipart subsidy: a cash grant of $300-$1000 per
individual for low-income people, and a tax credit worth the same amount to
higher income people. All gains on funds in Equitable HSA accounts will be
exempt from income tax so long as the funds are used for healthcare expend-
itures. This multiform subsidy allows lower-income people to enter the mar-
ket and incentivizes higher-income people to set aside money for healthcare
spending. We also propose to loosen the prerequisites for accessing an
HSA—a high-deductible plan would not be necessary—while imposing
more stringent requirements to ensure that HSA funds are actually spent on
healthcare. As discussed below, Equitable HSAs could be complementary to
other more fundamental changes in healthcare finance and delivery. This
proposal is not intended to displace other elements of current healthcare pol-
icy; it is not intended as a substitute for elements of the ACA, nor as an
alternative to proposals such as Medicare-for-All.
The remainder of this Part details our proposal and various design op-
tions for Equitable HSAs. The key provisions are summarized on Table 1,
below. We recognize that there are alternative ways to use the HSA concept
to introduce broad-based consumer-driven healthcare in a manner that is
mindful of distributional effects. The key insight here is that the combination
of a market-based mechanism and a subsidy to allow participation in the
market can make Equitable HSAs more effective at achieving both the mar-
ket and redistributive goals that regularly feature in healthcare debates, thus
making the policy appealing across a broad political spectrum.
A. The Proposed Equitable HSA: Cash Grants and Tax Credits
Equitable HSAs provide three different forms of government subsidy,
separately targeting lower-income households and higher-income house-
Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23,
24–25 (2006) (arguing that tax incentives should, as a default, be flat across income levels).
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holds. First, for lower-income households, Equitable HSAs offer a cash
grant designed to bring them into the HSA program by providing a signifi-
cant subsidy as a portion of pre-tax income, and in a form that is easy to
utilize and thus induces their participation in healthcare markets. Second, a
different form of subsidy—a credit of 100% or 50% depending on income
level—is provided for higher-income people, which is designed to induce
these people to participate in HSAs, and also results in a nominally equal
subsidy amount across income levels. Third, for everyone who owns an
HSA, gains on funds carried over year to year in the account are excluded,
so long as the funds are eventually used for healthcare purposes. A broader
range of spending options (as compared to current policy) and more strin-
gent limitations on non-healthcare uses of HSA funds—to ensure that the
HSA subsidy accomplishes intended healthcare policy goals—accompany
these subsidies.
We propose a subsidy amount varying with household size. We suggest
a subsidy of at least $300 per individual or dependent in the household,
which is slightly more than the median per capita out-of-pocket healthcare
expenditure in recent years.43 Such a subsidy would allow lower-income
people to prepare for health shocks (whereby they are subject to unexpect-
edly high costs in one or a few years).
For low-income people, the cash grant is deposited annually and di-
rectly into the individual’s or household’s HSA account (perhaps via an HSA
debit card). This cash grant would be available in full to anyone earning
below 400% of the poverty line (above which the grant would phase out, as
described below and in the Appendix), which is the top cutoff for premium
tax-credit assistance under the ACA.44 Households that are between four and
ten times the poverty line would not receive any grant but instead would
43 See Philippe Gwet & Steven R. Machlin, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
MEPS Statistical Brief #495, Out-of-Pocket Health Care Expenses in the U.S. Civilian Nonin-
stitutionalized Population by Age and Insurance Coverage, 2014 (Oct. 2016), https://
meps.ahrq.gov/data_files/publications/st495/stat495.shtml [https://perma.cc/2EJR-85Y6] (re-
porting median out-of-pocket expenditure of $204 per person in 2014); see also Philippe Gwet
& Steven R. Machlin, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEPS Statistical Brief #507,
Out-of-Pocket Health Care Expenses for Non-Elderly Families by Income and Family Struc-
ture, 2015 (Jan. 2018), https://meps.ahrq.gov/data_files/publications/st507/stat507.pdf [https://
perma.cc/EJ74-3NC6] (reporting median out-of-pocket expenditures of $451 per family in
2015, with families broadly defined to include one- and two-adult households with and without
children). For families consisting of one adult, the median out-of-pocket expenditure was
$242; for two or more adults with no children (“or more” presumably allowing for adult
dependents), it was $869; and for two adults with one or more children the median was $721.
See also FARRELL & GREIG, supra note 41, at 10 (reporting median out-of-pocket expenditures R
per family of $276 in 2016). Other surveys use different inputs to arrive at out-of-pocket costs;
for example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Surveys estimate out-of-
pocket healthcare expenses by combining amounts paid to providers of care and to insurers.
See ANN C. FOSTER, HOUSEHOLD HEALTHCARE SPENDING: COMPARING ESTIMATES FROM THE
CONSUMER EXPENDITURE SURVEY AND THE NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE ACCOUNTS,
2013-2016, at 7 (2018).
44 See Federal Poverty Level (FPL), HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glos
sary/federal-poverty-level-FPL/ [http://perma.cc/3DNZ-A2MW].
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receive a credit to match or partially match amounts that they contribute to
the HSA.45 For the highest-income households, no grant or credit would be
available—those households do not need a government subsidy to be able to
save—but they are permitted to make contributions of their own funds to the
HSA, and returns on those funds are exempt from income tax. For the low-
est-income individuals and families,46 the Equitable HSA subsidy will allow
them to save for out-of-pocket costs that are not covered by Medicaid, pro-
grams like the ACA, or other insurance. The cash-grant subsidy amount
could be used on any qualifying medical expense in the current year, and it
would carry over to subsequent years as well.
The subsidy amount for Equitable HSAs proposed here is $300 (regard-
less of income or household size). Assuming a subsidy amount of $300 per
person, for a household of four earning up to $100,000, the total HSA grant
would be $1200 per year. For a household of two, the HSA grant of $600
would be available if their incomes total less than $33,000. These house-
holds would also be permitted to make additional contributions to the HSA
up to the deductible amount in their insurance plan.
Households earning above the cash grant threshold would be eligible
for an annual tax credit for HSA contributions up to the lesser of $300 per
taxpayer or dependent in the household, or a total amount equal to the de-
ductible for the health insurance plan the household is enrolled in. For a
family of four earning $125,000 (which is well above the phaseout level)
and enrolled in a health insurance plan with a $10,000 deductible, the credit
would be worth up to $300 per person, or $1200. If the family made contri-
butions to the HSA of $2400, that with the $1200 credit would leave $3600
in the HSA. They could then make additional contributions of up to $6400 to
cover the $10,000 deductible for the year. All contributions are of after-tax
funds; no deduction is permitted (and thus the upside-down subsidy effect
found in existing HSAs is eliminated). The credit amount would be depos-
ited into the account at the time of the contribution and, as with the direct
cash grant, the amount could be used with an account-specific HSA debit
card on any qualifying medical expense in the current year. As with cash
grant amounts, any unused portion could be carried over to future years.
For households earning more than ten times the poverty line (around
$160,000 for a couple; around $250,000 for a family of four), the credit
phases out. For these households, the HSA is available but provides only a
means to defer tax on gains, i.e., no deduction is available for contributions.
45 The details of the phaseout are further elaborated in the Appendix.
46 Households qualifying for Medicaid are incomes below 139% of the federal poverty
line in states that expanded Medicaid under the ACA, and those with incomes below 100% in
other states. The 139% cut-off for a single individual in 2018 is $48,560; for a married couple,
the cut-off is $65,840; and for a family of four, the cut-off is $100,400. See HENRY J. KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., WHERE ARE STATES TODAY? MEDICAID AND CHIP ELIGIBILITY LEVELS FOR
CHILDREN, PREGNANT WOMEN, AND ADULTS (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/
fact-sheet/where-are-states-today-medicaid-and-chip/ [https://perma.cc/L9PT-UAAJ].
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\56-2\HLL205.txt unknown Seq: 14 28-MAY-19 15:18
408 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 56
These households can contribute up to the amount of their plan deductible.
So, for example, a family of four earning $300,000 with an insurance plan
deductible of $10,000 can contribute up to $10,000 to the HSA, but the
family receives no immediate tax benefit on these contributions.47 (Some
alternative design options related to transition issues are discussed in further
detail in the Appendix.)
In the absence of evidence that willingness to make contributions to
HSAs varies with income,48 the proposed structure sets the appropriate sub-
sidy level and makes that subsidy amount available to most taxpayers, while
adjusting the mechanism for delivering the subsidy so that lower-income
people are not prevented from participating due to lack of resources. This
approach should address progressivity concerns of those who have tradition-
ally opposed HSAs. At the same time, an important feature of consumer-
driven healthcare is that patients should be attentive to costs in making deci-
sions about their healthcare. Giving money to people who would not other-
wise have any ability to act as healthcare consumers and encouraging
higher-income people to contribute their own money promotes participation
in consumer healthcare markets across varying income levels (instead of
working effectively for some but not others, depending on their income).
47 Phasing out the tax credit subsidy is consistent with retirement savings policies such as
IRAs, in which the tax benefits phase out entirely for the highest earners. See DENNIS R.
LASSILA & BOB G. KILPATRICK, EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS TAX GUIDE ch.10
(LexisNexis ed. 2018).
48 The variation of elasticities of taxpayers along the income spectrum regarding different
behaviors remains contested and is a fertile area for future empirical research. See infra notes
68–69 and accompanying text. R
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TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF HSAS AND EQUITABLE HSAS
Features of Health Savings Accounts Equitable Health Savings
Policy (Current Policy) Accounts
$0 to $300 per individual,
varying based on income (cash
$0 to $2553 per household subsidy for low-income people;
depending on family size and limited and diminishing taxInitial Subsidy income (higher subsidy for credit for households withAmount higher income because subsidy income over 4x the federal
is in the form of deduction). poverty line; no subsidy for
incomes over 10x the federal
poverty line).
Deferral of tax on balances, butUnlimited deferral of tax on requirement that at least 70-balances (greater subsidy forDeferral 80% of healthcare costs eachhigher-income account holdersBenefit year must be covered fromwho pay out-of-pocket for HSA funds, or lose tax benefitshealthcare expenses). for the year.
Broadens what funds are
allowed to be used for,Funds can be withdrawn forUse of Funds including over-the-counterqualifying medical expensesfor Medical medications and treatmentssuch as medications, doctors’Expenses such as weight loss treatments,visits, and procedures. fertility treatments, and dental
services.
Withdrawals for any expenses
other than qualifying healthcare
costs are subject to a 100%Penalties for Funds withdrawn for other uses penalty up to the subsidyNon-Medical are subject to income tax and amount and withdrawalsExpense additionally taxed at 20%. beyond the subsidy amountWithdrawals must be included in income
and subject to an additional
penalty of 20%.
Penalties remain applicable
Funds can be withdrawn for over age sixty-five; funds canUse of Funds any purpose without any tax or be used without penalty forOver Age penalty by any account holder Medicare supplement premiumsSixty-Five over age sixty five. (and out-of-pocket medical
costs).
Beneficiary can continue to useBeneficiary includes HSATreatment HSA funds as HSA funds (withbalance in income; no penaltiesWhen Account limitations described above), orfor non-healthcare expendituresHolder Dies include in income and pay 20%by beneficiary. penalty to remove restrictions.
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B. Design Options and Subsidy Conditions
In order to focus the subsidy on the desired outcomes—subsidizing
healthcare expenses and promoting consumer-driven healthcare—we pro-
pose adjusting the withdrawal rules for HSAs to limit HSA expenditures to
healthcare needs and to prevent conversion of HSA funds to non-healthcare
purposes.
First, the proposed Equitable HSA assumes the availability of Medicare
or programs like the ACA. If these programs remain in place, to qualify for
the HSA subsidy, the covered individuals must procure insurance providing
adequate basic coverage.49 This includes, for example, covering preventive
care and screenings that are proven to have long-term health benefits and
promoting long-term savings by catching problems early. Additionally, the
Equitable HSA might require that insurance provides for annual wellness
checkups, including preventive care evaluations, and basic preventive care
services such as immunizations.50 This approach calibrates the proposed eq-
uitable HSA subsidy with broader federal healthcare policy.
Note that, in contrast to current HSA policy, we do not require partici-
pation in a high-deductible plan.51 Although we do require insurance that
covers minimum basic services and some preventative care,52 this aspect of
the proposal could be further relaxed. For example, the uninsured could be
permitted to benefit from the subsidy as well. If low-income uninsured per-
sons could qualify for HSAs, the cash subsidy would give them some assis-
tance to deal with out-of-pocket costs. This additional cash in the hands of
price-sensitive consumers could help the development of healthcare markets,
bolstering the patient-driven care model.
Second, the definition of allowable HSA expenditures could be broad-
ened to include healthcare-related expenses that could benefit from renewed
market forces—for example, over-the-counter medicines and treatments.53
This step would require allowing HSA funds to be spent on healthcare pro-
cedures and products that often are not presently covered by insurance—for
example infertility treatment, weight-loss procedures, dental services, and
over-the-counter medications and products. HSAs would thus be able to help
49 These requirements might simply be “essential health benefits” similar to those pre-
scribed by the ACA under 48 U.S.C. § 18022 (2012). For a description of coverage require-
ments under the ACA, see What Marketplace Health Insurance Plans Cover, HEALTHCARE
.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/coverage/what-marketplace-plans-cover/ [https://perma.cc/
X8FQ-FKYQ].
50 These requirements are conditions for the type of insurance coverage that a person must
have in order to qualify for the Equitable HSA subsidy.
51 See supra note 12. R
52 See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. R
53 The Senate Republicans’ 2017 proposal included loosening rules to allow HSA funds to
be spent on insurance premiums and nonprescription drugs. See Better Care Reconciliation Act
of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. (2017).
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consumers deal with out-of-pocket costs generally not covered by
insurance.54
Third, most qualifying healthcare spending must be attributed to the
HSA account each year. Under current rules a high-income family might add
to its HSA balance each year while paying for healthcare costs out of pocket
with after-tax dollars. This helps convert the HSA into a pure savings vehi-
cle, with tax-favored dollars eventually subsidizing non-healthcare spending.
For HSA account holders with plenty of excess cash and few tax-deductible
savings vehicles, this may be a smart approach. But this practice could be
eliminated with little administrative difficulty by requiring that most (say
seventy to eighty percent) qualifying healthcare spending must be done with
HSA funds. Some gaming would still be possible, but this would make it
more difficult and would focus HSA dollars on healthcare spending
purchases.55
Fourth, Equitable HSAs will end the practice of using HSAs as a vehi-
cle for retirement planning by requiring HSA funds to be spent only on
healthcare for the life of the account owner. Extending the healthcare limita-
tion on HSA spending beyond age sixty-five partially addresses the unin-
tended use of HSAs for retirement planning. To facilitate this rule, HSA
spending limitations should be liberalized to allow the funds to be used on
Medicare, Medicare supplement premiums, and out-of-pocket costs for indi-
viduals. Withdrawals for non-healthcare purposes should be subject to a one
hundred percent penalty up to the subsidy amount (including any gains on
the subsidy principal),56 and withdrawals beyond the subsidy amount must
be included in income and subject to an additional penalty of twenty per-
cent.57 Like current HSAs, amounts not spent on healthcare in the year of
contribution could be carried forward indefinitely and could be invested with
tax-free returns.58 But Equitable HSAs should either maintain the require-
54 See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text. R
55 There is potential value in inducing economy on the part of taxpayers, an effect which
may be enhanced by allowing taxpayers to recoup some of the savings to the government of
reduced healthcare spending. The policy mechanisms for achieving the right balance in this
respect require further consideration.
56 This will prevent recipients of both the cash grant and the credit from using the funds
for purposes other than healthcare at any time. The penalty amount should be adjusted to
reflect tax free gains as well (an adjustment which could be based on an approximation of
market returns, or on actual returns to the account holder).
57 For example, assume that a joint filing taxpayer with income over 400% of the poverty
line and a $3000 deductible contributes $2400 in year 1 and receives a $600 credit, but has no
healthcare spending. She will carry a balance of $3000 into year 2. Further assume that the
$3000 earns a 10% return, growing to $3300, and the taxpayer withdraws $1000 and spends it
on non-healthcare goods. The taxpayer will be subject to a 100% penalty on the first $660 (the
$600 subsidy amount plus the $60 gain on that subsidy). On the additional $340 she will have
an inclusion in year 2 income of $240 (the remaining tax-free gain), plus a penalty of $68 (a
20% penalty on the $340 amount). This treats the subsidy amounts as the first amounts with-
drawn at any time and discourages any non-healthcare withdrawals.
58 Currently, gains in HSA balances carried over year to year are shielded from taxation.
26 U.S.C. § 223(e) (2012). Our proposal strengthens the penalty provisions for withdrawals
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ment of using HSA funds for healthcare expenditures only, even after the
HSA account is transferred to a successor of a decedent, with the penalty
provisions described above continuing to apply, or the penalties and tax
should be imposed on the decedent as ordinary income at the time of death.59
This will eliminate the use of HSAs as an unrestricted estate planning tool.60
C. Cost
This Section provides rough cost estimates for each of the three primary
elements of the proposed Equitable HSA subsidy—cash grants, credits, and
deferral/exclusion of gains.61
Cash Grants. The primary cost of Equitable HSAs is the cash grant
subsidy. If the subsidy amount is $300, and the cash grant is available only
for persons with health insurance coverage, the cost to the federal govern-
ment would be approximately $50 billion per year.62 If every household with
earnings below 400% of the poverty line qualifies for the cash grant (which
would be the case if there is no requirement for insurance coverage), the cost
to the federal government would be approximately $56 billion each year. If
the grant amount is $1000 per person, then the cost ratchets up to $167.5
billion per year with 100% uptake.
Credits. The cost of our proposed HSA tax credits for households with
income above 400% of the poverty line depends on how much those house-
holds contribute to HSAs. If half of these households contribute to HSAs to
for non-healthcare expenditures to help ensure that these tax-free gains are spent consistent
with the purposes of HSAs.
59 This might be structured as an election one way or the other, to avoid the potentially
harsh result of penalty and liability in the case of premature death. Thanks to Gregg Polsky for
highlighting this concern.
60 For an example of how HSAs can be used as an estate planning tool, see 26 U.S.C.
§ 223(f)(8) (permitting HSA funds to be transferred to a beneficiary without penalty beyond
generating taxable income for the beneficiary).
61 See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 115TH CONG., JCX-67-18, ESTIMATED
BUDGET EFFECTS OF H.R. 6311 (2018) (providing cost estimates for recently-proposed
changes to existing HSAs); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 110TH CONG., JCX-66-08, TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR HEALTH CARE (2008), (describing HSAs and cost estimates for HSAs
generally).
62 Calculated as follows: approximately 87.4% of the U.S. population with income below
400% of the poverty line currently has health insurance coverage, and approximately 59% of
the U.S. population has income below 400% of the poverty line, meaning a total of 167.5
million people would qualify for the $300 subsidy (based on a total population of 325 million).
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2016, tbl.4 (2017),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/demo/p60-260.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7G8F-HQZ4]; HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., DISTRIBUTION OF THE TO-
TAL POPULATION BY FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL (ABOVE AND BELOW 400% FPL) (2016), https://
www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/population-up-to-400-fpl/ [https://perma.cc/JMJ4-F3JL].
This calculation ignores the (likely) incentive effect whereby uninsured persons will procure
health insurance in order to qualify for the cash grant subsidy. Thanks to David Kamin for
pointing out that in this respect the cash grant HSA can act as a form of the now-defunct
individual mandate. This analysis also assumes that all health insurance is qualifying health
insurance; this should be true under the ACA, with the exception of grandfathered plans which
are permissible but in some cases do not include coverage of some essential health benefits.
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qualify for the full subsidy amount of $300 per person, then the total subsidy
cost would be $17.5 billion, which would prompt HSA contributions totaling
at least $35 billion.63
Deferral and Exclusion of Gains. The deferral benefit potentially ap-
plies to all HSA participants, but cost estimates vary greatly depending on
how much each household carries over each year. In any year, the cash grant
covers median out-of-pocket costs, meaning that half of individuals should
be able to carry forward some balance. If that group carries forward one-
third of their balance, the total carryforward will be approximately $18 bil-
lion. Among the higher-income groups, a reasonable (though rough) esti-
mate is that they will carry forward five-sixths of their balances in any given
year, a total of approximately $42 billion.64 Among the highest-income
group, which receives no subsidy for contributions, if one-third of house-
holds participate and contribute $300 per person, they will carry forward
approximately $2.4 billion per year. Thus, the deferral benefit will accrue on
approximately $62 billion of additional funds in the first year, with some-
thing on the same order of magnitude in future years, though reduced by
expenditures in high out-of-pocket cost years.65 If the return on these funds
is 5%, the budget cost of deferral will be something on the order of $465
million, although that cost will be recovered if those funds are not used for
medical purposes and are thus subject to taxation later.66
The total budget cost is thus something on the order of magnitude of
$70 billion each year. The proposed cost is not trivial, but it is well within
the range of expenditures that HSA advocates in Congress proposed for ex-
panding the current, inequitable HSAs as part of the effort to repeal Obama-
care.67 With a larger subsidy of $1000 per person, the cost of our proposal
would be in the vicinity of $225 billion to $230 billion each year.
63 This calculation assumes that the elimination of the subsidy for households earning
about 10x the poverty line applies to approximately the top 5% of individuals, thus leaving
36% of total persons in the income range that qualifies for the proposed HSA credit.
64 This is based on half of those households spending less than $300 per person, and all of
those households having a balance of $900 per person in order to qualify for the full credit.
65 See supra note 41 (discussing uneven distribution of high out-of-pocket costs across the R
population and across time).
66 This $465 million estimate is based on total carryover of $62 billion in the first year and
an overall average effective income tax rate of 15%, see TAX FOUND., SUMMARY OF THE LAT-
EST FEDERAL INCOME TAX DATA, 2017 UPDATE, https://taxfoundation.org/summary-federal-
income-tax-data-2017/ [https://perma.cc/MS64-GE7U], and will increase each year as addi-
tional funds are saved and carried over. For point of reference, recent estimates indicate that
retirement plans and accounts (IRAs, defined contribution plans, and defined benefit plans)
have combined assets of around $15 trillion, and the budget estimates for the combined cost of
current contributions and deferral of gains is around $218 billion for 2017. See STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAX’N, 115TH CONG., JCX-34-18, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR
FISCAL YEARS 2017-2021 (2018).
67 See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 115TH CONG., JCX-27-17, ESTIMATED REV-
ENUE EFFECTS OF THE TAX PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN TITLE II OF H.R. 1638, THE “AMERICAN
HEALTH CARE ACT OF 2017,” AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2017) (estimat-
ing annual costs of $45 billion to $104 billion per year for a variety of health-related policy
changes, including around $3 billion per year of additional incentives for existing HSAs).
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D. A Call for Additional Research
The lack of data on HSAs—who uses them, how they are used, and
how effective they are at achieving their stated policy goals—is, frankly,
surprising.68 To evaluate the efficacy of HSAs, we need to understand the
responsiveness across income levels of would-be account holders to using
HSAs and how this varies depending on whether there is a government sub-
sidy, the size of the subsidy, and how the subsidy is administered, as well as
whether account holders will in fact engage in price-shopping for healthcare
services and products.69
IV. CONSIDERING CASH GRANTS AS A MODEL FOR SOCIAL POLICY
A. Advantages and Disadvantages
The linchpin of the Equitable HSA is the cash grant, which allows more
people to participate as price-sensitive consumers in the healthcare market
and creates a redistributive aspect to the policy. The term “cash grant” re-
fers, very generally, to currency remitted from the government to an individ-
ual or entity. These payments could be made periodically or all at one time
in a lump sum. They could be made by transferring funds into a bank ac-
count, by making funds available on a cash or debit card, or even by provid-
ing physical currency.
We assess below the merits of using cash grants to achieve social policy
goals. We distinguish cash grants from in-kind benefits as well as from gov-
ernment benefits that offset other liabilities. For example, the non-refunded
portion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”)70 is credited against tax
68 There is some research, but many questions remain. See KATE M. BUNDORF, CON-
SUMER-DIRECTED HEALTH PLANS: DO THEY DELIVER?, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. RE-
SEARCH SYNTHESIS REP. NO. 24 (2012) (impact of CDHPs on healthcare services use and
spending); PAUL FRONSTIN & M. CHRISTOPHER ROEBUCK, QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE AFTER
ADOPTING A FULL-REPLACEMENT, HIGH-DEDUCTIBLE HEALTH PLAN WITH A HEALTH SAVINGS
ACCOUNT: A FIVE-YEAR STUDY, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF NO. 404 (2014); BUN-
TIN M. BEEUWKES ET AL., Health care Spending and Preventive Care in High-Deductible and
Consumer-Directed Health Plans, 17 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 222 (2011); Zarek C. Brot-
Goldberg et al., What Does a Deductible Do? The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Health Care
Prices, Quantities, and Spending Dynamics, 132 Q.J. ECON. 1261 (2017); Thomas C.
Buchmueller, Consumer-Oriented Health Care Reform Strategies: A Review of the Evidence
on Managed Competition and Consumer-Directed Health Insurance, 87 MILBANK Q. 820
(2009); Paul Fronstin et al., Medication Utilization and Adherence in a Health Savings Ac-
count-Eligible Plan, 19 AM. J. OF MANAGED CARE 400 (2013); Amelia M. Haviland et al.,
How Do Consumer-Directed Health Plans Affect Vulnerable Populations?, 14 F. HEALTH
ECON. & POL’Y 1 (2011); Emmet B. Keeler et al., Can Medical Savings Accounts for the
Nonelderly Reduce Health Care Costs?, 275 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1666 (1996). These studies
show conflicting results—in some instances, higher income HSA users reduced healthcare
spending more than lower income users, and vice versa.
69 Very few studies have looked at elasticities and effects of HSAs across income levels.
See FRONSTIN & ROEBUCK, supra note 23, at 6–7 (summarizing the limited prior research). R
70 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2012).
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liability that would otherwise be owed but does not consist of an actual
transfer from the government to an individual. As a result, we would not
include this portion of the EITC in our definition of a cash grant.71 Examples
of existing cash grant programs include the refundable portion of the EITC,72
the refundable portion of the Child Tax Credit,73 and payments made under
the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program.74
The standard argument for cash grants is that cash is the best way to
satisfy preferences of the recipients “because preferences vary and individu-
als tend to have better information about their own situations than does the
government.”75 People are best positioned to determine their own specific
needs and wants, and cash assistance allows them to address their own chal-
lenges with maximum flexibility. According to this view, cash grants can
minimize administrative costs, making government expenditures more
effective.
A related benefit of cash grants, particularly appealing to libertarians, is
that cash grants give the recipient a measure of decisional autonomy, which
has value in and of itself. Because the sums in the grant can be exhausted,
the recipient presumably will act more responsibly in making expenditures
than if he or she did not face a budget.
Where goods or services are already exchanged in efficient private mar-
kets, a cash grant may be the most effective way to give people access to the
range of items available in those existing markets. For example, consider a
food subsidy: there already exists a well-developed market for consumer
food purchases, with competing supermarkets, extensive distribution net-
works, and adequate supplies provided by local, national, and international
producers. A food subsidy could be provided in-kind, in which case the gov-
ernment might create a parallel distribution system to deliver food to indi-
viduals who meet certain qualifications. But the government would also
need to determine how much food each family needed and what sort of food
would be appropriate. Since food is perishable, this would be an ongoing
process, not simply an annual or even monthly distribution. Alternatively, a
71 We recognize that cash grants, at some level of abstraction, are indistinguishable from
features of the tax code that reduce tax liability and from in-kind welfare benefits. Compare
Daniel N. Shaviro, Welfare, Cash Grants, and Marginal Rates, 59 S.M.U. L. REV. 835, 840
(2006) (arguing that “cash grant” is in practice shorthand for “non-income-conditioned cash
or in-kind grant,” a broad definition that includes economic equivalents), with David A. Weis-
bach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955
(2004) (advocating converting the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”),
which provides in-kind benefits through a process that involves certifying SNAP vendors, into
a cash grant program for administrative convenience).
72 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2012); Leslie Book, David Williams & Krista Holub, Insights from
Behavioral Economics Can Improve Administration of the EITC, 37 VA. TAX REV. 177 (2018).
73 26 U.S.C § 24. See generally Jacob Goldin & Zachary Liscow, Beyond Head of House-
hold: Rethinking the Taxation of Single Parents, 71 TAX L. REV. 367 (2018).
74 Near-cash grants, for example Section 8 housing vouchers which operate as cash to the
voucher holder, share some or all of the benefits and detriments that we explore here. How-
ever, for simplicity in this discussion, we set vouchers aside.
75
LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAX AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 175 (2008).
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cash grant allows consumers to plug directly into the existing private food
distribution network. Indeed, for precisely this reason, the Supplemental Nu-
trition Assistance Program (“SNAP”)76 is administered by providing debit
cards for use at certified grocery stores.77
Additionally, where a private market is a desirable way to set prices or
to prompt production, cash grants can provide the means for people to par-
ticipate in the market and thus can help make a market exist. The introduc-
tion of Equitable HSAs allows for this to occur. In fact, advocates for HSAs
often state that they want to introduce market forces (or stronger market
forces) into the provision of healthcare products and services.78
Cash grants have drawbacks as well. Most obviously, the flip side of
the flexibility that cash grants provide to the recipient is that cash grants
make it challenging for policymakers to control precise behaviors, particu-
larly as compared to in-kind benefits. This problem is most pronounced
where the desired behavior is very specific, and a substitute behavior will
not achieve the policy goal. For example, if the desired outcome is for the
beneficiary to visit a doctor and receive an immunization shot, an un-
restricted cash grant, even one limited to healthcare expenditures, would not
be as effective as a provision conditioning the grant on proof that required
immunization occurred. This would, of course, require developing an ad-
ministrable enforcement mechanism for that requirement.
But the imposition of strict and specific requirements on cash grants
starts to frustrate some of the benefits of cash grants. Program administration
becomes more cumbersome and expensive, and the benefits of flexibility
and autonomy start to fade. In the immunization example, while a highly
circumscribed cash grant might be possible, perhaps a better solution would
be to directly fund the immunization via insurers or healthcare providers so
that a patient can show up at the doctor’s office and receive shots without
paying. In these circumstances, an in-kind system seems preferable.79 Still,
in these contexts, technology, such as debit cards with restricted uses, can be
helpful. Nonetheless, the greater the restrictions, the more the cash grant
starts to look like a voucher.
Cash grants also face political challenges. Even modest cash grants can
stoke suspicion and resentment that has turned public opinion against grants
at times. One source of skepticism concerning cash grants is that recipients
76 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2036 (2012).
77 See Rep. Rosa L. DeLauro, Why America Should Save SNAP, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
267, 271 (2015).
78 For example, Kevin Brady (R-Tex.), the chair of the House Ways and Means Commit-
tee, recently emphasized “individual choice” and “competition” in advocating for expansion
of HSAs. Chairman Brady Opening Statement at Markup of Health Bills, HOUSE COMM. ON
WAYS & MEANS (Jul. 11, 2018), https://waysandmeans.house.gov/chairman-brady-opening-
statement-at-markup-of-health-bills/ [https://perma.cc/UG89-B8SC].
79 See generally KAPLOW, supra note 75, at 176 (discussing how government interventions R
can give rise to positive externalities and suggesting that many initiatives, including immuni-
zation, may be better pursued through in-kind benefits than through cash transfers).
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will misuse the money—perhaps in a manner that, beyond simply failing to
accomplish the policy goal, fully undermines or moves away from the de-
sired outcome. This precise issue is a perennial critique of the SNAP
program.80
B. Guidelines for Cash Grants as Social Policy
This Section provides guidelines for using cash grants to achieve social
policy goals. The subsidy amount and form of delivery should be deliber-
ately set to facilitate participation in the target market. Failure to make the
subsidy amount fit the task in this way is one of the fundamental problems
with existing HSAs. For example, under current policy, the subsidy amount
bears no relation to the deductible amount required for participation in the
HSA under a high-deductible plan.81 Further, because the form of the sub-
sidy (a deduction) essentially requires participants to have extra expendable
income and because there is no mechanism to compel spending on medical
care, the subsidy is essentially converted into a subsidy for savings.82
A better approach starts with the policy goal, identifies the market, and
works from there to arrive at the appropriate subsidy. In the case of HSAs,
the policy goal is broader access to affordable healthcare. The market (many
markets, really) is the market for all out-of-pocket healthcare expenses. Out-
of-pocket expenses include amounts paid due to a deductible and amounts
paid for goods and services not covered by insurance, such as over-the-
counter medication.83 The subsidy amount is slightly more than the median
out-of-pocket expenditure, allowing most people to cover most expenses in
most years. This also allows people to use the HSA to save additional money
for years when they may have higher expenses.84 The delivery mechanism is
designed to promote market participation. People who lack resources to save
for medical expenses receive a cash grant (that is not tied to filing a tax
return or some other timing mechanism, which is a mismatch with the nature
of the spending). Those who have some resources are encouraged to set
aside money for medical expenses. People with plenty of expendable income
receive no subsidy.
If the subsidy is miscalibrated, as is the case with existing HSAs, it will
be ineffective. Existing HSAs provide billions of dollars in subsidies each
year, but those subsidies generally benefit people who already have expend-
80 E.g., Anahad O’Connor, In the Shopping Cart of a Food Stamp Household: Lots of
Soda, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2017, at A1, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/13/well/eat/food-
stamp-snap-soda.html [https://perma.cc/YDR5-CV6E].
81 See supra notes 12–14, 32–35 and accompanying text. R
82 See supra notes 12–14, 32–35 and accompanying text. R
83 These expenses could also include the cost of health insurance. In our Equitable HSA
proposal, we implicitly account for the out-of-pocket cost of health insurance and do not re-
quire health insurance as a prerequisite for receiving the HSA subsidy.
84 The mean expenditure is significantly higher than the median expenditure because most
out-of-pocket spending is by a small group. See supra note 41. R
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able income, i.e., those who do not need help to become healthcare consum-
ers. The original design concept was that the HSA would only be available
to people in high-deductible plans, which presumably would encourage peo-
ple to act more like consumers than they might otherwise because they have
more at stake. But the deductible amount is not calibrated to any particular
healthcare needs, nor is the subsidy amount.
Additionally, any conditions attached to the cash grant or other subsidy
should reflect the program’s substantive policy and distributional objectives.
If the purpose of the program is to preserve the benefits of consumer auton-
omy, administrative requirements need to be kept to a minimum. If the pur-
pose is to promote spending on healthcare, it is not clear why HSA funds
should be used for any non-healthcare purpose without loss of subsidy and
incurring a penalty.
Regulatory conditions unrelated to core policy goals should be closely
scrutinized. For example, in summer 2017, various Republican proposals
limited HSAs to high-deductible plans that eliminate coverage for abor-
tions.85 Had this provision been enacted, it likely would have significantly
limited the use of HSAs because many individuals would be reluctant to
move to a plan with that restriction, as would many employers. Thus, the use
of the market-based policy to regulate behavior in a way that is not targeted
to either facilitating the market mechanism or to the redistributive goal could
potentially undermine the entire endeavor.
As a general rule, all elements of the policy should be germane to the
joint goals of promoting healthcare markets and allowing full participation
in those markets through progressive subsidies.
C. Broader Policy Implications
Many market-based policies enacted since the early 1980s have not in-
cluded the cash grant mechanism and have tended to reduce redistributive
benefits by shifting risks from government to private individuals, leaving
individuals to fend for themselves more often and in more contexts.86 Both
the shift toward market-based policies and the disregard of distributional
effects have been encouraged and reinforced by academic commentators.
Most prominently, a fundamental principle of the law and economics move-
ment holds that legal rules should optimize efficiency, and such rules should
be set without regard for distributional effects.87 Under this approach, any
85 E.g., American Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. § 202 (2017), https://
www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1628 [https://perma.cc/AQJ6-FJAZ].
86 Examples of market-based policies include 401(k) and 403(b) retirement savings ac-
counts (which have widely replaced defined benefit plans for private and public sector em-
ployees alike), and public charter schools, school choice programs, and private school
vouchers, all of which are touted as allowing students and parents to shop between schools and
incentivizing schools to compete for students, but arguably merely shift the burden of dealing
with underperforming schools. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 401(k), 403(b) (2012).
87 See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 31–35 (2002).
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distributional considerations should be dealt with through the tax and trans-
fer system (i.e., separately and independent of the legal rule regime).88 Many
commentators who are enthusiastic about this framework often focus on the
first part—efficiency optimization—and disregard or assume away the eq-
uity-redistributive element.89
Recently, however, economic inequality has gained greater attention.90
Support along the ideological spectrum for cash grants as a way to promote
market participation with attention to distributional effects offers hope of
moving past partisan wrangling whereby progressives and market libertari-
ans are essentially unable to engage with one another because they perceive
their policy goals to be mutually exclusive. This unity is particularly surpris-
ing in the broad enthusiasm for universal basic income proposals.91 The Eq-
uitable HSA proposal presented here follows this same thread, albeit in a
more targeted context.
V. CONCLUSION
It is past time for HSAs as they currently exist to be reexamined and
reformed. Equitable HSAs can help control costs without sacrificing health-
care consumer autonomy, focusing government subsidies in a way that in-
creases the government’s bang-for-its-buck in promoting informed
consumption of healthcare services. At the same time, Equitable HSAs can
strengthen the progressivity of the tax code. This should be a win-win for
proponents of market-based policy solutions, as well as for egalitarians con-
cerned with equity in government aid. Equitable HSAs also help illuminate
the utility of cash grants as a policy mechanism that can potentially bridge
the divide between Democrats and Republicans on some social programs.
88 See id.
89 See id. at 32 (“[T]here are sound reasons for much normative economic analysis of law
not to take explicit account of the distribution of income.”). Of course, some have addressed
distributional considerations as well. See Revesz, supra note 10. See generally Robert N. R
Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2008) (arguing for a United States cap-and-trade system for carbon diox-
ide emissions that would auction carbon dioxide allowances to companies, increasing the auc-
tioned amount over time—the profits of which could, in turn, be redistributed to reduce taxes,
reduce the costs of the tax system, and provide other socially beneficial policies).
90 Some scholars have begun to reconnect issues of economic inequality with the decades-
long move towards reliance on private markets. See, e.g., David Singh Grewal, The Laws of
Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626 (2014) (reviewing THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014)). And some have started to push back against the perceived
obsession with markets and efficiency in policymaking. See WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE
DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION (2015).
91 See Glogower & Wallace, supra note 9. R
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APPENDIX: PHASEOUT OPTIONS
This Appendix details one possible approach to the transition points
between (1) the cash grant subsidy delivery mechanism that is available for
low income people, (2) the 100% credit available for higher income people,
(3) the 50% credit available to even higher income people, and (4) the
phaseout of the 50% credit so that the highest income people do not receive
any upfront subsidy for contributions to HSAs.
As represented on Figure 1 and the accompanying table, for a family of
four and a subsidy amount of $300 per individual (note that this subsidy
amount could be more—we propose up to $1000 per individual), households
with income up to $125,000 (which is four times the poverty line) would
receive a cash grant of $1200. For each $10 earned above $125,000, the cash
grant would be reduced by $1; thus, the cash grant would be entirely phased
out once income reaches $137,000. See infra Figures 1, 2. Over that same
range, a 100% credit would be available, so that an individual contribution
of $1 yields a credit of $1. See infra Figures 1, 3. This approach incentivizes
households to put additional funds into the HSA if they are on the higher end
of the cash-grant range, and reduces the “penalty” for increased earnings if
they are in the phaseout range. The total subsidy amount remains capped at
$1200 (based on same limitation as described above for the cash grant: $300
for each person in the household).
Above the phaseout range, the credit is available at a 50% rate. See
infra Figures 1, 3, 4. For example, if the family of four introduced above
earns $131,000, the cash grant is reduced by $600 ($6000 over the threshold,
reducing the cash grant by $1 for every $10 yields $600). If the family con-
tributes $1200 to the HSA, they will receive a cash grant of $600 and a
matching credit of $600, so that they have a total of $2400 contributed to the
HSA. See infra Figure 3.
If income is above the cash grant phaseout range, the credit percentage
is 50%: Every $1 contributed to the HSA yields a credit of $0.50. For exam-
ple, if the family of four earns income of $143,000 and makes a contribution
of $1200 to the HSA, they will receive a total subsidy of $900, of which
$600 is from the 100% credit and $300 is from the 50% credit. See infra
Figure 3. If that same family contributes $1800 (or more) to the HSA, they
will receive a total credit of $1200, of which $600 is from the 100% credit
and $600 is from the 50% credit. See infra Figure 4.
A phaseout similar to that illustrated in Figure 4 will occur for house-
holds exceeding ten times the federal poverty line. For every $10 over that
threshold, the credit amount will be reduced by $1. Thus, if the threshold for
a family of four is $250,000, at that precise income level the family can
contribute $2400 to the Equitable HSA and receive a tax credit of $1200 at
the 50% rate. If the household earns $250,010, the credit will be reduced to
$1199. Of course, the household may make additional contributions to the
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\56-2\HLL205.txt unknown Seq: 27 28-MAY-19 15:18
2019] Equitable HSAs 421
HSA up to the annual deductible amount of the qualifying insurance cover-
age, but there is no immediate tax benefit for those contributions.
FIGURE 1: EXAMPLES OF PHASEOUT FROM GRANT TO CREDIT
1 2 3 4 5 6
Non-Subsidy Contrib. $0 $0 $600 $1,200 $1,200 $2,400
Grant $1,200 $600 $600 $0 $0 $0
100% Credit $0 $0 $600 $1,200 $600 $0
50% Credit $0 $0 $0 $0 $300 $1,200
HSA Balance $1,200 $600 $1,200 $2,400 $2,100 $3,600
AGI $125,000 $131,000 $131,000 $137,000 $143,000 $149,000
























































Non-Subsidy Contrib.  Grant 100% Credit 50% Credit
HSA Balance  AGI AGI + HSA Subsidy
FIGURE 2: NON-SUBSIDY CONTRIBUTION OF $0
1 2 3 4 5 6
Grant $1,200 $600 $0 $0 $0 $0
100% Credit $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
50% Credit $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
HSA Balance $1,200 $600 $0 $0 $0 $0
AGI $125,000 $131,000 $137,000 $140,000 $143,000 $149,000
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FIGURE 3: NON-SUBSIDY CONTRIBUTION OF $1200
1 2 3 4 5 6
Grant $1,200 $600 $0 $0 $0 $0
100% Credit $0 $600 $1,200 $900 $600 $0
50% Credit $0 $0 $0 $150 $300 $600
HSA Balance $2,400 $2,400 $2,400 $2,250 $2,100 $1,800
AGI $125,000 $131,000 $137,000 $140,000 $143,000 $149,000















































 Grant 100% Credit 50% Credit HSA Balance  AGI AGI + HSA Subsidy
FIGURE 4: NON-SUBSIDY CONTRIBUTION OF $2400
1 2 3 4 5 6
Grant $1,200 $600 $0 $0 $0 $0
100% Credit $0 $600 $1,200 $900 $600 $0
50% Credit $0 $0 $0 $300 $600 $1,200
HSA Balance $3,600 $3,600 $3,600 $3,600 $3,600 $3,600
AGI $125,000 $131,000 $137,000 $140,000 $143,000 $149,000















































 Grant 100% Credit 50% Credit HSA Balance  AGI AGI + HSA Subsidy
